Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1988

Brian M. Barnard v. Utah State Bar and Stephen
Hutchinson : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Brian M. Barnard; Utah Legal Clinic; Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Robert Rees, Carman E. Kipp, Richard Burbridge, Stephen Mitchell, Jo-Carol Nesset-Sale; Attorneys
for Defendants.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Barnard v. Utah State Bar, No. 880201.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2152

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU

Uu T A H

SUPREME v,uum
BRlEg

DOCKET N O J - 2 ^ — — *
uu

IN T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F U T A H

B R I A N M. B A R N A R D ,
Plaintiff, Cross-Appellant,
& Respondent,
vs.

Case N o . 88 - 0201

U T A H STATE B A R a n d
STEPHEN HUTCHINSON,
Defendants, Appellants,
& Cross-Respondents.

P r i o r i t y # 14 b .

REPLY BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT
and R E S P O N D E N T

C r o s s - A p p e a l from a S u m m a r y J u d g m e n t
of the T h i r d J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court
in a n d for Salt L a k e C o u n t y
The H o n . Homer Wilkinson, Judge Presiding

BRIAN M. BARNARD
U S B # 0215
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
214 E a s t F i f t h South
Salt L a k e C i t y , U T A H
84111
A t t o r n e y s for P l a i n t i f f / C r o s s Appellant & Respondent
R O B E R T REES
U S B # 4125
CARMAN E. KIPP
USB # A1829
175 E a s t 4 0 0 S o u t h
# 330
Salt L a k e C i t y , U T A H
84111
RICHARD BURBIDGE
USB # 0492
STEPHEN MITCHELL
U S B # 2278
139 E a s t S o u t h T e m p l e
# 2001
Salt Lake City, UTAH
84111
JO-CAROL NESSET-SALE
425 E a s t F i r s t S o u t h
Salt L a k e C i t y , U T A H

84111

A t t o r n e y s for D e f e n d a n t s /Appellants
& Cross-Respondents

F-nri
"

[~~- -=*>

Li L»=S £L=-« i^»

J All- 41989

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BRIAN M. BARNARD,
Plaintiff, Cross-Appellant,
& Respondent,
vs.
UTAH STATE BAR and
STEPHEN HUTCHINSON,
Defendants, Appellants,
& Cross-Respondents.

Case No. 88 - 0201
Priority # 14 b.

REPLY BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT
and RESPONDENT

Cross-Appeal from a Summary Judgment
of the Third Judicial District Court
in and for Salt Lake County
The Hon. Homer Wilkinson, Judge Presiding

BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB # 0215
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, UTAH
84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff/CrossAppellant & Respondent
ROBERT REES
USB # 4125
CARMAN E. KIPP
USB # A1829
175 East 400 South
# 330
Salt Lake City, UTAH
84111
RICHARD BURBIDGE
USB # 0492
STEPHEN MITCHELL
USB # 2278
139 East South Temple
# 2001
Salt Lake City, UTAH
84111
JO-CAROL NESSET-SALE
425 East First South
Salt Lake City, UTAH

84111

Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
& Cross-Respondents

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CASES, STATUTES & OTHER AUTHORITIES
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT
I.
THE UTAH STATE BAR IS SUBJECT
TO THE ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICES and
INFORMATION PRACTICES ACT
II.
APPLICATION OF THE INFORMATION PRACTICES ACT
& THE PUBLIC WRITINGS ACT
TO THE UTAH STATE BAR
DOES NOT OFFEND THE CONCEPT
OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
III.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
KNOW HOW GOVERNMENT MONEY IS SPENT
IV.
THE UTAH STATE BAR
IS A STATE AGENCY
V.
AN EXERCISE OF DISCRETION REQUIRES
FINDINGS OF FACT BY THE COURT
VI.
PURE QUESTIONS OF LAW
MAY BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST
TIME ON APPEAL
CONCLUSION
APPENDIX.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

page

TABLE OF CASES, STATUTES & OTHER AUTHORITIES

Constitution Cited
Utah Constitution, Art. VIII, § 4

2, 9

Statutes Cited
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended)
§§
§
§
§
§§
§§
§
§

63-2-59 et seq
63-2-60 (2)
63-2-61 (2)
63-2-61 (8)
63-2-75 -- 63-2-79
63-2-85.4 et seq
63-2-88
63-2-88 (1)

§§
§
§
§§

63-30-1 et seq
63-30-10
63-30-11
63-50-1 et seq
(Chapter 194, S.B. No. 232,
passed March 11, 1975)

§ 78-26-1 (2)
§ 78-26-2

2, 5
10
3
2, 3
4
5
4, 14
3
6
6
6
5, 6

7
7

Rules Cited
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 52(a)

13

Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar
Discipline & Sanctions, Rule VII (e) & (f) . . .

10

Revised Rules of the Utah State Bar for
Admission to the Bar, RULE NINE

11

Cases Cited
Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d 953 (Ut. 1983)

13

Ex Parte Auditor of Public Accounts, 609 S.W.2d 682
(Ky. 1980)

8

In Re Washington State Bar Assoc, 548 P.2d 310
(Wash. 1976)

8

LeGrand Johnson Corp. v. Peterson, 18 Utah 2d 260,
420 P.2d 615 (Utah 1966)

13

Parks v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 673 P.2d 590, 601
(Ut. 1983)

12

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
THE UTAH STATE BAR IS SUBJECT TO THE ARCHIVES AND
RECORDS SERVICES and INFORMATION PRACTICES ACT because it is
an agency of the Utah Supreme Court and a state agency as
defined in the statute. That act applies to the judiciary
as well as the executive branch of government. The
Governmental Immunity Act does not preculde this suit under
that statute.
APPLICATION OF THE INFORMATION PRACTICES ACT & THE
PUBLIC WRITINGS ACT TO THE UTAH STATE BAR DOES NOT OFFEND
THE CONCEPT OF SEPARATION OF POWERS because these statutes
are mere regulatory enactments and not a usurpation of the
power of the judiciary. The Public Writings Act is tempered
by the Information Practices Act.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO KNOW HOW GOVERNMENT MONEY
IS SPENT is further and protected by the Utah Information
Practices Act and the Public Writings Act.
THE UTAH STATE BAR IS A STATE AGENCY since in
everything it does it is supervised by this Court and since
it perform important governmental functions.
AN EXERCISE OF DISCRETION REQUIRES FINDINGS OF FACT BY
THE COURT and therefore a denial of statutory damages and
statutory attorney fees must be supported by factual
findings. Plaintiff's position is that the statute mandated
an award of fees and statutory damages, but if there is
discretion allowed in such awards, the discretion must be
supported by facts.
PURE QUESTIONS OF LAW MAY BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME
ON APPEAL, therefore, not only may questions of
constitutionality be considered for the first time on
appeal, but the impropriety of defense counsel may be
considered by this Court on appeal when raised but not
resolved by the trial court.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

BRIAN M. BARNARD,
Plaintiff,
Cross-Appellant,
Respondent,
vs.
UTAH STATE BAR and
STEPHEN HUTCHINSON,
Defendants
Appellants,
Cross-Respondents

Case No. 88-0201

REPLY BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT
and RESPONDENT

THE PLAINTIFF and CROSS-APPELLANT, BRIAN M. BARNARD, by
and through the UTAH LEGAL CLINIC through submits the
following REPLY BRIEF in support of his cross-appeal and in
reply to the defendants' response Brief.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE UTAH STATE BAR IS
SUBJECT TO THE UTAH INFORMATION
PRACTICES ACT
Clear Language of Statute
If the Utah Legislature had wanted the Archives and
Records Services and Information Practice Act, Ut. Code Ann.
§§ 63-2-59 et seq (1953 as amended) (hereinafter "the Act11)
not to apply to the Utah Courts, the Legislature could have
said so.

The defendants' creative reading of the Act's

provisions (Defendants1 Reply Brief, pp. 4 - 5) provides
little assistance in interpretation of the Act.
Defendants argue that Act does not apply to them.
Defendants claim (Defendants1 Reply Brief, pp. 7 - 8) the
Utah State Bar is not a "responsible authority11 as defined
in the Act.

"Responsible authority" is defined as any state

office or state official established by law as a body
responsible for the collection of any set of data on individuals.

Ut. Code Ann. § 63-2-61(8) (1953 as amended).

The

Utah State Bar is responsible for collecting information
about the plaintiff, all bar applicants and members and all
of its employees.
The Utah Supreme Court is obligated by law (Utah
Constitution, Art. VIII, § 4) to supervise the admission of
persons to practice law in Utah, which includes collecting

information about applicants and members; that function has
been delegated by the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah State
Bar.

As a functionary of the Utah Supreme Court, the Utah

State Bar is a "responsible authority" as defined in the
Act.
Defendants seem to argue (Defendants' Reply Brief, pp.
7 - 8 ) that a "responsible authority" is not a "state
agency."

A "responsible authority" is any state office or

official established by law as a body responsible for the
collection of data.
amended)

Ut. Code Ann. § 63-2-61 (8) (1953 as

"State agency" is defined as a department, board,

bureau or other unit, however designated, of the state. Ut.
Code Ann. § 63-2-61 (2) (1953 as amended)

The construction

of those two statutes is simple. When a "state agency"
collects data it becomes and is a "responsible authority."
The terms are used almost interchangeably throughout the
applicable portion of the Act.

Therefore, since the Utah

Supreme Court is an entity of the state, its agent the UTAH
STATE BAR is a state agency and a responsible authority.
The two terms, state agency and responsible authority
also relate to the defendants' suggestion (Defendants' Reply
Brief, pp. 7 - 9) that plaintiff has sued the wrong parties
and that suit, damages and attorney fees are authorized only
against "the state" by Ut. Code Ann. § 63-2-88(1) (1953 as
amended).

That contortion makes nonsense of the provisions

authorizing suit since by statutory definition a
"responsible authority" is never the State but always a

person or a state agency.

The three sub-sections of Ut.

Code Ann. § 63-2-88 (1953 as amended) read together, make it
clear that relief, suit, damages, and injunctions are
available against the "responsible authority" and and the
"state agency" and not just "the state."

Archives and Records Service Act
vs.
Information Practices Act
The state archivist's "record management program" is a
noble goal as set out in Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-2-75 -- 63-2-79
(1953 as amended), but that program has little to do with
the obligations of responsible authorities and state
agencies which hold public information related to "the
public's business." Those duties are set out in the latter
part of the Act and do not relate to the record management
program.

The "record management program" may be of interest

only to the executive branch, but that does not prevent
application of unrelated latter sections of the Act to the
Utah State Bar. Much of the Act relates to the general
functions of the state archives and the state archivist and
the creation of a state-wide records management program;
that fact lends no support for the defendants' claim (Defendants' Reply Brief, pp. 4 - 5) that the provisions of the
Act "relate only to the executive branch of state
government."
Defendants' argument (Reply Brief, pp. 4 - 5) comes
from ignorance of the fact that prior to 1979, the statutes

regarding state archives and records, the Archives and
Records Service Act were found at Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-2-59
et seq. (1953 as amended in 1969), and the Utah Information
Practice Act was found at Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-50-1 et seq.
(1953 as amended in 1975).

The two statutes were combined

by the legislature in 1979 into their present form.

The two

(2) different areas of legislative concern are related but
the various provisions of the formerly two statutes can not
be internally construed in a consistent manner.

The Utah

Information Practice Act as originally enacted in 1975
provides no support for a claim that it applies only to the
executive branch of government.
Defendants' concern for the interpretation of the Act
by the Department of Administrative Services (Defendants1
Reply Brief, p. 4 - 5) is not helpful.

The rules adopted by

the Department of Administrative Services deal predominantly
with the "records management program;11 those rules do not
deal with, and cannot supercede, the statutory provisions
which apply to the defendants and require the release of
public information, found at the latter portion of the Act.
Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-2-85.4 et seq (1953 as amended).
Defendants through creative mis-interpretation of Ut.
Code Ann. §§ 63-2-59 et seq (1953 as amended) attempt to
confuse the issues. None the less, the determination must
be made that the Utah State Bar is a state agency which
collects information on behalf of the Utah State Supreme
Court and performs functions for that Court and is therefore
s

subject to the reasonable statutory requirements of the Utah
Information Practices Act and the Public Writings Act.

Governmental Immunity?
Defendants' Governmental Immunity Act argument (Defendants' Reply Brief, p. 3) raised for the first time on
appeal is a non-issue.

The Utah Information Practices Act

created a new and separate cause of action exclusive of the
Governmental Immunity Act (Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1 et seq
(1953 as amended).

The 1975 enactment of the Utah Informa-

tion Practices Act (Chapter 194, S.B. No. 232 passed March
11, 1975) included a waiver of governmental immunity for invasions of privacy through an amendment of the Governmental
Immunity Act, Ut. Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1953 as amended).
In addition, the plaintiff herein seeks declaratory and
injunctive relief, along with statutory damages and attorney
fees; such claims do not require notice under the
Governmental Immunity Act.

Finally, plaintiff's letters to

defendants (November 6, 1987 and December 11, 1987 -Exhibit "C" and Exhibit "D" to plaintiff's appellate brief)
are sufficient notice and comply with the notice
requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act, Ut. Code Ann.
§ 63-30-11 (1953 as amended).

c

Public Writings Act Tempered by
Information Practices Act
Defendants acknowledge (Defendants1 Reply Brief, pp. 6
- 7) that the Public Writings Act applies to "judicial
records" (Ut. Code Ann. § 78-26-1(2) (1953 as amended)) and
then imply that that act removes all powers of a Court to
seal its records or to withhold information from the public.
The implication is false.
The Utah Information Practices Act defines classes of
information and determines which types may be made public
and which are to remain confidential.

Thus, the Public

Writings Act is tempered by the Information Practices Act -that is acknowledged and anticipated in the Public Writings
Act ("except as otherwise expressly provided by statute");
the Information Practices Act modifies the Public Writings
Act (Ut. Code Ann. §78-26-2 (1953 as amended)).

Absent a

countervailing force, those judicial records determined to
be private or confidential, are not to be available to the
public.

II.
APPLICATION OF THE INFORMATION PRACTICES ACT
& THE PUBLIC WRITINGS ACT
TO THE UTAH STATE BAR
DOES NOT OFFEND THE CONCEPT
OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
The defendants express concern that the legislature
should not be allowed, through statutes, to control what
information the UTAH STATE BAR is required to release since
the Bar as "an arm" of the judiciary must not be controlled
by the legislature.

(Defendants' Reply Brief, pp. 5 - 7 ) .

In reality, many aspects of the judicial system are affected
by legislative enactments. Application of the Information
Practices Act and the Public Writings Act to the Utah State
Bar would not be a serious blow to our three branch form of
government.

The application of these Acts to an agency of

the Utah Supreme Court does not offend the doctrine of
separation of powers.

Cases Cited by Defendants
To fuel the fear of the destruction of our tri-partite
government by plaintiff's claims herein, defendants cite In
Re Washington State Bar Assoc, 548 P.2d 310 (Wash. 1976)
and Ex Parte Auditor of Public Accounts, 609 S.W.2d 682 (Ky.
1980).

There are clear distinctions between those cases and

the case at bar.

In both cited cases the legislative branch

was a party to the action against the state bar and was
attempting to audit the bars1 finances and records in search
of malfeasance.

In the instant case, plaintiff a dues

paying member of the Bar, simply seeks specific information
about how the Bar spends its (his) money.

This is not an

instance of one branch of state government attempting to
interfere with another.
The provisions of the Utah Information Practices Act
and the Public Writings Act which require disclosure of
information, are not unconstitutional usurpations of judicial power, but simply reasonable regulations protecting the
plaintiff's constitutional right to know how government
money is spent.
At issue here is not the regulation of the practice of
law, a power belonging to the judiciary -- at issue is a
minor regulatory provision.

The statutes at issue do not

infringe on the power of the Utah Supreme Court.

This is

not an attempt by the Legislature to usurp powers of the
Judiciary.

With those provisions applied to the UTAH STATE

BAR, the Utah Supreme Court still completely and solely
governs the practice of law in Utah.

Art. VIII, § 4, Ut.

Const.

III.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO KNOW HOW GOVERNMENT MONEY IS SPENT.
The Utah Archives and Records Services and Information
Practices Act, recites in a provision entitled LEGISLATIVE
INTENT:
(2) In enacting this act, the Legislature recognizes two fundamental constitutional rights: (a)

the right of privacy in relation to personal data
gathered by state agencies, and (b) the public's
right of access to information concerning the
conduct of the publicfs business. [emphasis
added]
Ut. Code Ann. § 63-2-60 (2) (1953 as amended).
The broad reference of the statute to "the public1s
business11 lacks any restrictive language suggesting
application only to the executive branch.

The "public's

business" is conducted in Utah courts as well as an agency
working for the Utah courts and obligated to regulate a
profession in Utah.
The two statutes at issue in this case protect the
constitutional right of the plaintiff (and of the public) to
know how government conducts "the public's business."

IV.
THE UTAH STATE BAR
IS A STATE AGENCY
In their attempt to show that the UTAH STATE BAR is
something other than "an arm" of the Utah Supreme Court,
defendants errorenously state "the Bar can only make recommendations to the Supreme Court concerning the admission
and discipline of attorneys."
2)

(Defendants' Reply Brief, p.

The UTAH STATE BAR can and does impose certain private

discipline upon attorney without consultation or approval by
the Supreme Court.

(Discipline & Sanctions, Rule VII (e) &

(f), Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar).
is no appeal from such private discipline.

There

The UTAH STATE

BAR can prevent a person from taking the Utah bar exam by a
determination that the applicant lacks appropriate moral
character; there is no appeal from that determination.
(RULE NINE, Revised Rules of the Utah State Bar for Admission to The Bar as approved by the Utah Supreme Court,
effective January 1, 1988).

Such great governmental powers

belongs not to some voluntary fraternal organization but
only to a state agency.
Defendants1 analogy of a law firm contracting to serve
as county attorney for a small Utah county is interesting,
(Defendants1 Reply Brief, p. 3) but the conclusion the
defendants draw is erroneous. With regard to all of the
work that such a contracting firm does for the county, that
law firm is a governmental agency and must comply with the
Utah Information Practices Act and the Public and Private
Writings Act. And, in deed, a member of the public could
insist on knowing exactly how much that contracting law firm
is being paid for its services to the county!

The

defendant1 analogy fails because everything the UTAH STATE
BAR does is a governmental function.
Defendants continue to falsely claim that the UTAH
STATE BAR "performs a number of functions which have nothing
to do with the admission or discipline of attorneys or any
governmental function11 and, therefore, it is not a state
agency.

(Defendants1 Reply Brief, p. 4) That is directly

contradicted by the affidavit of Steve Hutchinson filed
herein which says that in everything it does, the UTAH STATE

BAR is subservient to the Utah Supreme Court; therefore
every function of the UTAH STATE BAR is a government
function!

(As an Appendix attached to this brief is a copy

of the Supplemental Affidavit of the defendant Hutchinson.)
Unless Stephen Hutchinson is a liar, all functions of the
UTAH STATE BAR are governmental functions!

Therefore, the

UTAH STATE BAR is an agency of the Utah Supreme Court in all
regards.

Therefore, the UTAH STATE BAR is subject to public

scrutiny under the Acts.

V.
AN EXERCISE OF DISCRETION
REQUIRES FINDINGS OF FACT
BY THE COURT
Defendants claim that the denial of statutory damages
and attorney fees herein was discretionary on the part of
Judge Wilkinson.

Defendants' Reply Brief, p. 8.

An act of

discretion must be supported by facts; this Court cannot
review discretionary acts without supporting findings of
fact.

Defendants are correct when they say that findings of

fact are not normally required when a summary judgment is
granted, (Defendants' Reply Brief, p. 9), but findings are
required in this case!
Findings of fact serve two important purposes. First,
findings of fact serve to inform the parties about the "mind
of the court" and the analysis the court sued to resolve the
dispute.

Parks v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 673 P.2d 590, 601

(Ut. 1983).

As this Court has stated in LeGrand Johnson

Corp. v. Peterson, 18 Utah 2d 260, 420 P.2d 615 (Utah 1966),
ff

[t]he right to resort to the courts for the adjudication of

grievances and the settlement of disputes is a fundamental
and important one. An indispensable requisite to fulfilling
that responsibility is the determination of questions of
fact upon which there is disagreement.11

420 P. 2d at 616.

The second purpose of findings of fact is to provide a
basis on which an appellate court can review the judgment.
Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d 953, 957 (Ut. 1983)("Proper
findings are essential to enable this Court to perform its
functions of assuring that the findings support the judgment
and that the evidence supports the findings.")
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does
not mandate findings of fact in every case resolved by
summary judgment motions, but in a case such as this,
findings are essential.

Rule 52(a), upon a ruling on a

motion for summary judgment, requires that the court enter
"a brief written statement of the ground for its decision
. . . when the motion is based on more than one ground."
There was no such statement or supporting explanation by the
trial court in this case.
Defendants claim support for the trial court's denial
of statutory damages based upon a determination that the
defendants1 violation was "in good faith."
Reply Brief, p. 8)
factual findings.

(Defendants'

Such a determination was made without
There is nothing in the record to suggest

"good faith" on the part of the defendants.

The Information Practices Act mandates an award of
attorney fees for any violation and requires assessment of
statutory damages for a willful violation.
§ 63-2-88 (1953 as amended).

Ut. Code Ann.

There is a no statutory

exception allowing denial of attorney fees upon a showing of
fl

good faith,11 nor does the statute allow discretion as to

attorney fees.

Ut. Code Ann. § 63-2-88 (1953 as amended)

Absent strong justification, the trial court was
obligated to award statutory damages and attorney fees to
the plaintiff.

The absence of supporting facts, prevent

this Court from properly reviewing the "discretionary"
decision of the trial court.

VI.
PURE QUESTIONS OF LAW
MAY BE RAISED FOR THE
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
False allegations of unethical conduct must concern
this Court, the constitutionally mandated and ultimate
supervisor of the practice of law in Utah.

The defendants,

responding to plaintiff's complaint, accused plaintiff of
improper and unethical conduct; in the court below, they
presented no evidence to support that false charge. The
trial court make no direct ruling on their claim, however,
the falsity of the charge was established by the ruling of
Judge Wilkinson in favor of the plaintiff.

The plaintiff presents for this Court's consideration,
as a legal question, the improper conduct of the Utah Bar
Counsel as attorney for the defendants.

The requested

consideration and review represents a pure question of law,
which may be raised for the first time on appeal (similar to
an issue of constitutionality being raised).

In support of

this position, the Court should consider the Appellants'
Memorandum in Opposition to Appellee's Motion to Strike,
September 26, 1988, filed herein, which sets forth the
various exceptions to the rule that matters not raised in
the trial court may be raised for the first time on appeal.
False and unfounded allegations of unethical conduct
must not be countenanced by this Court. Appropriate action
should be taken by this Court in response to the Fifth
Affirmative Defense of the defendants.

(T.R. 49-50).

CONCLUSION
Ignoring the formal trappings of this law suit and
setting aside the niceties of legal theory, one has to ask:
WHAT IS SO OFFENSIVE ABOUT INFORMING A
DUES-PAYING MEMBER OF THE UTAH STATE BAR
AS TO EXACTLY HOW HIS DUES ARE BEING
SPENT?
SHOULD NOT THE BUSINESS OPERATIONS OF A
COMPULSORY MEMBERSHIP ORGANIZATION LIKE
THE UTAH STATE BAR BE SUBJECT TO PUBLIC
SCRUTINY?

The ruling of the trial court should be affirmed; the
trial court properly determined that the Utah Information
Practices Act and the Utah Public Writings Act apply to the
~V\vi V:\VZ BA.R. The denial of statutory damages and
-'.n.i-iKj iees should be reversed.
The appeal of the defendants should be denied and this
matter remanded with instructions to grant statutory damages
and attorney fees to the plaintiff, including fees incurred
on appeal.
DATED this 3rd day of January, 1989.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiff &
Cross-Appellant
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

SUPPLEMENTAL
AFFIDAVIT OF
STEPHEN F. HUTCHINSON

BRIAN M. BARNARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
UTAH STATE BAR and.
STEPHEN HUTCHINSON,

Civil No. C88-0578
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Salt Lake

)

ss.

STEPHEN F. HUTCHINSON, being first duly sworn deposes
and states as follows:

1 •

I am currently the Executive Director of the Utah

State Bar, a position I have held since July 1, 1985.
of the defendants in this action.

I am one

I am an attorney licensed to

practice law in Utah.
2.
officer

As Executive Director I am the chief administrative

of

the

Commissioners

Bar

for

operations.

and

all

of

am

responsible

the

day-to-day

to

the

Board

management

of

of
Bar

I am responsible for the implementation of policies

and resolutions adopted

by the Board of Commissioners.

I have

authority with respect to the hiring and firing of all Bar staff
employees, except for staff in the office of Bar Counsel.

I work

with

annual

the

budget

budget

for

responsible

and

approval
for

finance

committee

to prepare

by

Board

Commissioners.

the

coordinating

the

of
Bar's

creation of the Law and Justice Center.
Bar

President

negotiate
approved

and

as

the

public

sign contracts

budgetary

limits of

Board of Commissioners.

involvement

I am

with

the

I act as back-up to the

spokesperson
and other

the

for

the

instruments

Bar.

I

within the

the Bar or as authorized

by the

I have responsibility for overseeing the

activities of 55 sections and committees of the Bar, development
and implementation of Bar education programs and meetings of the
Bar

membership,

referral service.

Bar

publications,

admissions,

and

the

lawyer

I also have a developing role in the area of
-2-

professional
participant

research

and

development

activities.

I

am

a

in the annual formal meetings between the Board of

Commissioners and the Utah Supreme Court where a full report of
the Bar activities

is given to the Court and where the Court

gives its input and guidance relative to the Bar activities.
am also present at the less formal meetings held
every several months usually involving
of

Commissioners

and

the

Utah

I

approximately

less than the full Board

Supreme

Court

or

some of

the

justices of the Court, where matters pertaining to the Bar are
discussed.
the

In these meetings and in other activities I assist

President

of

the

Bar

and

the

Board

of

Commissioners

in

fulfilling their responsibilities of reporting the activities of
the

Bar

to

the

Utah

Supreme

Court.

I

also

fulfill

other

functions and have other duties as may be prescribed by the Board
of Commissioners.
3.

On or about April 14, 1988, I executed an affidavit

in this case.

A true and accurate copy of that affidavit

attached to this affidavit.

is

Some amplification of the statements

made in that affidavit may serve to clarify those statements.

I

did not intend to suggest by my statements in the affidavit that
the Utah Supreme Court does not have any direction or control
over some of the activities of the Utah State Bar.
Integration and

Management

of the
-3-

Utah State Bar

The Rules for
specifically

state that the Bar is "under the direction and control" of the
Supreme Court.

I understand that to mean that the Bar, in all

its activities and functions, is under the Court's direction and
control.

What

I intended to say in my previous affidavit was

that the Supreme Court exercises less direct supervision and has
less direct involvement with regard to some activities of the Bar
than with

regard

to other

activities

of the Bar.

As

to all

activities, however, the Court retains ultimate control.
my understanding

It is

that the Utah Supreme Court could at any time

exercise its authority and terminate any specific activity of the
Bar or terminate tne existence of the Bar itself.

I consider the

Utah State Bar to be completely subservient to and accountable to
the Utah Supreme Court.
of the Court
Board

of

The Bar seeks the approval and the input

as it designs and

Commissioners

meets

implements

regularly

new programs.

with

the Utah

The

Supreme

Court to report to the Court and to receive the Court's guidance
and

instructions.

the Court covering

The Bar provides regular written reports to
financial matters, disciplinary actions, and

other matters.
DATED this j _

day of September, 1988.
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o
September,

before

me t h i s /f

day

of

1988.

Mi

ri . (/

NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission E x p i r e s :

Residing 'at; ^/laS^

*//s/9o
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RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq., #0492
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, Esq., #2278
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
Attorneys for Utah State Bar
139 East South Temple, #2001
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 355-6677
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BRIAN M. BERNARD,

vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF
STEPHEN F. HUTCHINSON IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

UTAH STATE BAR and
STEPHEN HUTCHINSON,

Civil No. C80-0578
Homer Wilkinson, Judge

Plaintiff,

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

ss.

I, STEPHEN F. HUTCHINSON, being first duly sworn do say:
1.

I am the Executive Director of the Utah State Bar

(hereinafter referred to as the "Bar").
2.

The Bar is an unincorporated non-profit organization

which was originally organized in 1931.
3.

In 1981, the Utah Supreme Court integrated the Bar.

At the same time, the Supreme Court adopted the "Rules for
Integration of the Utah State Bar" and the "Rules of
Organization and Management of the Utah State Bar".

In its

Rules for Integration/ the supreme court recited that it was
perpetuating, creating and continuing the Bar under its
direction and control.

r

The supreme court also recognized the
PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

capacity of the Bar to sue and be sued, to enter into contracts
and hold and dispose of property.

In this connection, the

supreme court specifically recognized the right of the Bar, both
before and after integration, to privately own funds and
property.

In this regard, the Bar owns the building where it

maintains its offices.
4.

The Bar is not financially supported by any taxes or

other public funds.

Rather, the Bar is supported solely by dues

and fees paid by its members and Bar applicants.

The Bar pays

property taxes on the real and personal property which it owns,
unlike state agencies which are exempt from such taxes.

Bar

employees are not paid by the state, are not entitled to join
any of the state's retirements programs and are not entitled to
obtain insurance through the state.
5.

The Utah Supreme Court delegated and authorized the

Bar to recommend to the Supreme Court rules for admission and
rules for discipline of attorneys practicing in the Utah State
Courts.

The Bar did so and the rules have been approved and

adopted by the supreme court.

All decisions which the Bar and

its authorized committees make concerning the admission,
suspension or disbarment of members of the Bar are advisory only
to the supreme court, which retains the inherent power to admit,
discipline or disbar members of the Bar.
6.

The Bar is engaged in numerous other activities not

connected with th,e admission or discipline of Bar members which
are not in any way governed, regulated or supervised by the
supreme court.

These activities include the semi-annual Bar

meetings, various educational courses and seminars, a Newsletter
and the Law and Justice Center in Salt Lake City.
DATED this

yi

\

day of April, 1988.

STEPHEN F. HUTCHINSON
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
April, 1988.

day of

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah
My Commission Expires:
dd8982a

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I herebv certify that on the 3rd day of JANUARY, 1989,
I caused to be mailed two (2) copies of the above and
foregoing pleading REPLY BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT and
RESPONDENT to each of the following:
CARMAN E. KIPP, Esq.
ROBERT H. REES, Esq.
Attorneys for Defendants
and Cross-Respondents
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

# 330
84111

RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq.
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, Esq.
Attorneys for Defendants
and Cross-Respondents
139 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah

# 2001
84111

JO-CAROL NESSET-SALE
Attorney for Defendants
and Cross-Respondents
425 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

and

counsel for the opposing parties, postage prepaid in the
United States Postal Service.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Cross-Appellant &
Respondent

